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ABSTRACT 
This essay examines the terms of the Judicial Oath sworn by the judges in the Athenian courts 
during the classical period. There is general agreement that the oath contained four basic 
clauses: (1) to vote in accordance to the laws and decrees of the Athenian people, (2) to vote 
about matters pertaining to the charge, (3) to listen to both the accuser(s) and defendant(s) 
equally, and (4) to vote or judge (dikasein) with one’s most fair judgment (dikaiotatê gnômê). 
Some scholars believe that the fourth clause gave judges the right to vote according to their con-
science and to ignore the law if they found it unjust. The first part of the essay shows that this 
clause gave judges the right to make decisions solely on the basis of their most just judgment 
only where the laws gave no clear guidance. It was a default clause invoked only twice in the ex-
tant orations; it was never used as justification to ignore the written laws. The second part ad-
dresses the view that the courts took political factors into account during trials. Although some 
trials involved leading politicians, the courts were bound by their oath to decide whether the de-
fendant was guilty of the charge brought by the accuser. The only part of a trial where a defen-
dant might mention his political achievements or his public largesse was at during the assess-
ment of the penalty (timêsis) in a trial on a public charge (graphê).  
 
 
0. The rule of law was one of the most important cultural values in Athenian de-
mocracy. When delivering the funeral oration for the Athenian soldiers who fell 
at Lamia in 322 BCE, Hyperides (Epitaphios 25) declares: “For men to be happy 
they must be ruled by the voice of law, not the threats of a man; free men must 
not be frightened by accusation, only by proof of guilt; and the safety of our citi-
zens must not depend on men who flatter their masters and slander our citizens 
but on our confidence in the law.” (trans. Cooper). In another funeral oration 
(this one probably not delivered), Lysias (2.19) praises the ancestors of the Athe-
nians because “They thought it characteristic of wild animals to gain power over 
each other through violence, but that men ought to define what is just by law, per-
suade each other with reason, and serve both these aims by submitting to the rule 
of law and being instructed by reason.”1 Thucydides (2.37) attributes a similar idea 
                                                 
1 All translations of Greek texts in this essay are my own unless otherwise indicated.  
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to Pericles in the funeral oration he delivered in 430 BCE: “In public life we do 
not violate the laws because we obey those in office at any time and the laws, es-
pecially those established to help those who are wronged.” In the Ephebic Oath, 
which the young men of Athens swore every year, each ephebe promises to obey 
the established laws and any laws that may be established prudently in the future.2 
The Athenians did not find the rule of law incompatible with the idea of popu-
lar sovereignty. In fact, they believed that the two ideals went hand in hand. 
Aeschines (3.6) asserts that when the Athenians obey the laws, the democracy re-
mains safe. The same orator says that when the courts allow themselves to be dis-
tracted by irrelevant charges, the laws are neglected, and the democracy under-
mined (Aeschin. 1.179. Cf. 3.23). In his Against Timocrates Demosthenes 
(24.215-6) goes so far as to claim that the power of Athens derived from its citi-
zens’ obedience to the laws: 
Although you should be angry with everyone who establishes shameful and 
wicked laws, you should be most angry with those who corrupt the laws that 
make our city weak or great. What are these laws? Those that punish wrong-
doers  and grant honors to the just. If all men were eager to do good for the 
community  and ambitious to gain honors and awards for this, and if all 
were to refrain from criminal acts out of fear for the harm and penalties im-
posed on them, what  prevents our city from being great? Does Athens not 
have more triremes than any Greek city? More hoplites? More cavalry? More 
revenue? More possessions? More harbors? What protects and preserves all 
these things? The laws. When the  city obeys them, all these resources serve 
the common interest.  
But the rule of law was not a mere slogan invented only for rhetorical pur-
poses. The Athenians did their best to put this ideal into practice in their daily life 
and especially in their courts. Every year the six thousand men who were selected 
to serve as judges swore an oath to cast their votes in accordance with the laws and 
decrees of the Athenian people. According to Pollux (8.122) and Harpocration 
(s.v. Ardettos) the judges swore the oath near the Ilissus river in the deme of 
Ardettus named after an Attic hero. In the speeches delivered before Athenian 
courts, litigants often refer to the oath and clearly expect the judges to abide by it.3 
Despite the clear implications of the oath, some scholars have claimed that the 
Athenians did not attempt to establish the rule of law.4 In their opinion, the judi-
cial oath did not bind them to follow the law. As a result, they assert (mostly with-
out evidence) that Athenian judges paid more attention to extra-legal considera-
tions than they did to the laws. The courts were thus not “guardians of the laws” 
                                                 
2 Rhodes and Osborne (2003) #88, lines 12-4.  
3 For example, see Antiphon 5.7; Demosthenes 18.2, 249; 19.1; 132, 134, 161, 239, 297; 
20.119, 159, 167; 21.24, 177, 211-2; 22.39, 46; 23.96, 101; 24.35, 148-50, 175, 191; 27.68; 
29.4; 36.1, 61; 39.37, 41; 43.84; 45.87, 88; 58.17; Isaeus 2.47; 4.31; 8.46; 11.18; Isocrates 
18.34; Lysias 14.22, 46;  
4 E.g. Ober (1989), Lanni (2006).  
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(Dem. 24.36), but arenas for political ambition or feuding.5 In the glossary of one 
recent collection of essays on Athenian law, one cannot even find any mention of 
the judicial oath.6  
This essay falls into two parts. The first part takes fresh look at the judicial oath 
and studies its basic provisions. In particular, it analyzes the phrase “I will vote 
with my fairest (or most just) judgment (gnômê dikaiotatê)” and corrects some re-
cent misunderstandings of this pledge. The second part examines the role of the 
laws in judicial decisions in Athenian courts and to what extent judges took extra-
legal factors into account.  
 
 
1. There has been some debate about the precise wording of the oath, but there is 
general agreement about four basic clauses in the oath.7 These are: 
1) To vote in accordance to the laws and decrees of the Athenian people (e.g. 
Aeschin. 3.6; Antiphon 5.7; Dem. 20.118). 
2) To vote about matters pertaining to the charge (Aeschin. 1.154; Dem. 
45.50. Cf. Aeschin. 1.170). 
3) To listen to both the accuser(s) and defendant(s) equally (Aeschin. 2.1; 
Dem. 18.2; Isoc. 15.21. Cf. Lucian Cal. 8). 
4) To vote or judge (dikasein) with one’s most fair judgment (dikaiotatê 
gnômê) (e.g. Dem. 23.96; 57.63).  
The first three pledges are relatively straightforward and have given rise to no 
major disagreement among scholars. The second pledge appears to have generally 
been observed: a recent study by Rhodes has shown that litigants in Athenian 
courts attempt to “stick to the point” and expected the judges to pay attention only 
to issues relating to the charge brought against the defendant.8 This means that if 
an accuser brought a case of homicide against someone, the court was only to 
                                                 
5 The most extreme proponent of this view is Cohen (1995). On the flaws of this approach 
see now Harris (2005).  
6 Cartledge, Millett, and Todd (1990) 232 has an entry under Oath, but does not mention 
the Judicial oath.  
7 The text of the oath found at Dem. 24.149-51 is not an accurate version but was com-
posed by a later writer and inserted into the text of the speech. One strong argument 
against its reliability is its omission of the fourth pledge in the oath, which is amply at-
tested in contemporary sources. The document contains some genuine parts of the oath 
but also elements that are unlikely to have been found in the actual oath. On the oath see 
especially Fraenkel (1878), Drerup (1898) 256-8, and Bonner and Smith (1938) 152-56, esp. 
155: “It is certain that the passage in Demosthenes by no means represents the heliastic 
oath as it was sworn in any one period, but that various details are included which would 
be found in the oath at every period: the promise to vote according to the laws and decrees 
of the Athenian people and the council of the five hundred, the promise not to accept 
bribes, the promise to listen impartially to both sides of the case and to vote on the subject 
at issue, the calling of the gods to witness, and the curse.”  
8 Rhodes (2004).  
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judge whether or not he had committed the offense of homicide. Litigants might 
interpret this pledge rather loosely and obviously had a much broader notion of 
“relevance” than modern courts do. For instance, litigants sometimes discuss the 
wider context of the case and the motives of their opponents (e.g Antiphon 6.33-
46). In some cases (e.g. Dem. 56.11-7) they discuss previous attempts at settle-
ment as a way of portraying their opponents as difficult and unreasonable; this tac-
tic is strictly forbidden in American courts. In general, however, litigants attempt 
to make all their statements relevant (either directly or indirectly) to the main 
charge.  
The fourth pledge has been the subject of some debate. The orators rarely 
quote or refer to this part of the oath. When they quote or paraphrase it, they ap-
pear to interpret it in two different ways. In his Against Leptines Demosthenes 
(20.118) says: “As for matters where there are no laws, you have sworn to follow 
your most honest judgment.” In Against Boeotus (Dem. 39.39-40) there is a simi-
lar version. But in Against Aristocrates (Dem. 23.96-7) this pledge appears to have 
a different meaning: “They have sworn to judge with their most just judgment, but 
the decision made by their judgment depends on what they hear. Now when they 
cast a vote in accordance with this, they are righteous. For everyone who casts his 
vote neither through enmity nor through favor nor any other unjust reason against 
their judgment, is righteous (i.e. upholds his oath).” In Against Eubulides (Dem. 
57.63) we find the same view of this pledge: “They have erased from the oath the 
pledge to vote according to one’s most just judgment, not out of favor or enmity.”9 
One might therefore infer that the oath only contained the word “I will vote 
(or judge) with my most fair judgment” and argue that the actual text of the oath 
did not contain these phrases and that they are only the interpretations invented 
by litigants.10 This argument faces two obstacles. First, Pollux (8.122) explicitly 
states that the phrase “about issues for which there are no laws” was in the oath. 
Second, there are several parallels for this phrase in oaths from other Greek 
communities. The closest parallel comes from the Gymnasiarchal Law from 
Beroia dated to the second century BCE.11 Every year the man elected to serve as 
gymnasiarch was required to swear: “I will perform the office of gymnasiarch ac-
cording to the law about the gymnasiarch and regarding all matters not written in 
the law I will (perform the office) using my own judgment as best I can following 
the rules of justice and morality (hosiotata kai dikaiotata), neither doing favors for 
a friend nor harming an enemy in violation of justice” (lines A 26-30).12 Like the 
judicial oath in Athens, the gymnasiarch promises to obey the law and use his best 
judgment only in cases where the law gives no guidance. He also pledges to act 
impartially, without special regard for friends or enemies. The wording is slightly 
                                                 
9 Plato Apology 35c appears to allude to this part of the oath.  
10 Thus Mirhady (forthcoming).  
11 For the date see Gauthier and Hatzopoulos (1993) 35-41.  
12 For the text see Gauthier and Hatzopoulos (1993) 18.  
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different from the oath in Athens, but the terms of the both oaths correspond very 
closely.  
There is another parallel in an inscription from Eresos dated to the reign of 
Alexander the Great.13 The inscription records a decree from Eresos establishing 
procedures for the trial of tyrants in accordance with a diagraphê of Alexander. 
The decree instructs the judges in the case to swear: “I shall judge the case, as far 
as it lies within the laws, according to the laws, and in other regards industriously, 
as well and as justly as possible” (lines 9-17) (trans. Rhodes). Here a distinction is 
also made between cases where the laws provide guidance and other kinds of 
cases, those presumably where the laws do not give answers about how to decide.14 
Another parallel can be found in a decree recording a treaty between Temnos 
and Clazomenai dated to the early second century BCE: “Let the following be the 
oath: I will judge cases for the people of Temnos and the people of Clazomenai 
and the metics and the rest of those dwelling in those cities who have lawsuits ac-
cording to the treaty (synthêkai), but about matters that have not been written in 
the treaty, with my most just judgment (gnômê dikaiotatê).”15 Here the term 
“treaty” (synthêkai) has been substituted for “laws,” but the general phrasing and 
ideas are the same. These parallels show that there is no reason to doubt that the 
phrases “about issues for which there are no laws” and “without hatred or favor” 
were in the oath sworn by Athenian judges. 
In his Rhetoric Aristotle appears to allude to this part of the judicial oath in his 
discussion of the judges’ pledge to “vote with one’s best judgment.” It might be 
tempting to rely on Aristotle’s analysis of the phrase in his Rhetoric for an under-
standing of this part of the judicial oath, but that temptation should be resisted. 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric is a work of theory; it does not claim to describe the actual 
discursive practices of the Athenian courts. Its discussion of forensic rhetoric in 
chapters 13-15 of Book I does outline some arguments similar to those found in 
the court speeches of the orators. But many of the arguments presented there 
never occur in these speeches.  
Aristotle’s discussion needs to be placed in context. Aristotle (Rh. 
1.15.1375a5-b12) advises the potential litigant in two potential cases: one where 
the written law does not favor one’s case and another where it does. For the first 
possibility he advises: “If the written law is contrary to our case one must use the 
common law and arguments based on fairness (epieikeia) because they are more 
just; that to judge according to one’s best judgment is not to follow the written laws 
in all cases (pantelôs).” On this interpretation, the pledge to judge with one’s most 
just judgment grants the judge the right to ignore the written law. Three points 
need to be made immediately. First, this interpretation of the oath is never at-
tested in Attic oratory. Second, the actual wording of the oath, confirmed by sev-
                                                 
13 Rhodes and Osborne (2003) #83 iii, lines 9-17.  
14 A similar distinction has been restored in the judicial oath found in an Amphictyonic 
Law - IG ii2 1126, lines 2-3.  
15 SEG 1130bis.28030 = Herrmann MDAI(I) 29 (1979) 249-71). 
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eral parallels, restricts the judge’s reliance on his most just judgment alone to in-
stances where “there are no laws.” Thus this interpretation is actually contradicted 
by the very terms of the oath. Third, this interpretation of this phrase would place 
the fourth pledge in the oath in potential conflict with the first pledge (“I will vote 
in accordance with the laws and decrees of the Athenian people”). It is highly 
unlikely that the oath would have bound the judge to potentially contradictory 
pledges.  
The arguments about not following the written law that follow support this 
conclusion. They are: 
1) Fairness (to epieikes) always remains and never alters nor does the common 
law (for it is in accordance with nature) but written laws often change. 
2) The just is something true and advantageous, but what appears to be just 
may not be; thus, the written law may not be; for it does not perform the function 
of law. The judge is like one who tests silver insofar as he distinguishes counterfeit 
justice from the true.  
3) It is the task of the better man to follow and abide by the unwritten laws 
rather than the written laws.  
4) If a law is contrary to a well esteemed law or is self-contradictory (for exam-
ple, in some cases one law provides that all agreements are binding, but another 
forbids one to make agreements contrary to the law) [the written law should not 
be followed]. 
5) If a law is ambiguous, so that one can twist it and see to which interpretation 
justice or advantage lends itself, one should then use that one.  
6) If the circumstances in which the law was established no longer remain, one 
should try to make this clear and use this argument to combat the law.  
None of these arguments is ever found in the court speeches of the Attic ora-
tors. For instance, no litigant in the extant orations ever argues that the court 
should ignore a law because it is obsolete (argument #6) or that one should rely 
on fairness (epieikeia) because the laws often change (argument #1).16 The third 
argument is based on the view that the unwritten laws are potentially in conflict 
with the written laws and holds that one should give preference to the unwritten 
laws over the written laws. In the only two passages in the orators where the un-
written laws are mentioned, however, we find a very different view of the relation-
ship between the written and unwritten laws. In his On the Crown Demosthenes 
(18.274-5) discusses three levels of culpability: doing wrong willingly (hekôn), do-
ing wrong unwillingly, and lack of success where there is no wrongdoing or mis-
take. Demosthenes continues by observing that these distinctions are not only 
found in the laws, but also in the unwritten laws set down by nature (for the dis-
tinction between willing and unwilling actions see also Dem. 21. 41-6). In Against 
Aristocrates Demosthenes (23.70) claims that Aristocrates’ decree violates both 
                                                 
16 Epieikeia is mentioned only once in the orators at Dem. 21.90 but the argument there 
does not resemble Aristotle’s in this passage. For the role of epieikeia in Athenian courts 
see Harris (2004).  
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the written and unwritten laws. Thus when Demosthenes mentions the unwritten 
laws in an argument, he sees no conflict between the two kinds of laws.17 Indeed, 
his view of their relationship with the written laws is exactly the opposite of Aris-
totle’s view in this passage of the Rhetoric.  
Nor does any litigant ever state that a law is ambiguous.18 On the contrary, the 
Athenians believed that their laws were easy to understand and that the meaning 
of their laws was clear (Dem. 20.93). If a word or phrase in a law could be inter-
preted in different ways, litigants do not say that the meaning of the law was am-
biguous, but employ a very different type of argument. For instance, the term ar-
chê in the law about the award of crowns for public officials could have two differ-
ent meanings, either “term of office” or “magistrate” (for a quotation of the law 
see Aeschines 3.31).19 If one takes the first meaning, the law only forbids the 
award of crowns to officials who have not yet undergone their audit for perform-
ance of their duties in office, but does not forbid crowns granted for other reasons 
(single acts of valor or generosity, a lifetime of public service). If one adopts the 
second meaning, the law forbids the award of a crown for any public official who 
has not yet undergone his audit for any reason. Yet in their speeches at the trial of 
Ctesiphon neither Aeschines nor Demosthenes states that the law was ambiguous 
or that one of its key terms could be interpreted in two ways. In his paraphrases of 
the law, Aeschines (3.11) implicitly interprets it in the latter way, but appears to as-
sume that this is the natural or customary meaning of the law. Demosthenes 
(18.111-19) likewise does not draw attention to the law’s potential ambiguity or 
that there are two possible ways of interpreting it. Instead he accuses his opponent 
of twisting the meaning of the law to suit his case (Dem. 18.111). He too takes the 
“natural’ meaning of the law for granted, but is in a stronger position because he 
has numerous precedents to support his view.20 So when there is an ambiguity in 
the law, litigants do not say that the judges must apply their own best judgment (as 
Aristotle advises). Instead they cite precedents or the intent of the lawgiver as it is 
found in written statutes to show that their interpretation of the law is to be pre-
ferred.21 
The same is true of the sixth argument proposed by Aristotle for ignoring the 
written law. Nowhere in any extant judicial speech does a litigant say that the 
                                                 
17 For the relationship between the unwritten and written laws of the polis see Harris 
(2006a) 53-7. 
18 In fact, the word used by Aristotle in this passage to describe an ambiguous law (amphi-
bolos) never occurs in all the speeches of the Attic orators.  
19 For an analysis of the legal arguments at the trial of Ctesiphon see Harris (2000) 59-67.  
20 For Demosthenes’ use of precedents in this speech see Harris (2006b) 362-3.  
21 For the use of precedents see, for example, Lysias 3.41-3. The defendant disagrees with 
his accuser about the nature of the intent in the charge of trauma ek pronoias. The defen-
dant claims that the intent in ek pronoias must involve advance planning, not merely de-
liberate action. To justify his view, he appeals both to the intent of the lawgiver and pre-
vious decisions by the Areopagus. On the use of precedents in Athenian law see Harris 
(2006b).  
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judges should ignore a law because it is obsolete. The attitude toward old laws 
found in the speeches is quite the opposite: speakers often praise old laws either 
because they were established by a venerable lawgiver like Draco or Solon (e.g. 
Dem. 20.90, 158) or because they have stood the test of time and have proven 
their value. The view of Antiphon (6.6. Cf. 5.14) is characteristic: “Everyone 
would agree in praising the laws governing these matters as the finest and most 
righteous of laws. They are the oldest established laws and have always remained 
the same, which is the best sign of well enacted laws for time and experience teach 
people the faults in things” (trans. Gagarin). Once more, Aristotle’s analysis can-
not be used as a guide to the rhetorical strategies employed in Athenian courts.  
By the same token Aristotle’s discussion of the phrase “with one’s best judg-
ment” cannot be used as evidence for the way Athenian litigants and judges inter-
preted the judicial oath. As the wording of the oath makes clear, its pledges bound 
judges to vote in accordance with the laws and decrees of the Athenian people. 
Judges were to rely on their most just judgment alone just in cases where there 
were no laws pertaining to the issue being debated. This was clearly a default 
clause to be used only in exceptional cases.  
But how often did litigants believe that it was necessary to resort to this default 
clause? Were there so many gaps in the Athenian lawcode that judges often had 
no choice but to rely on their own judgment? Some scholars assume that Athe-
nian laws were so riddled with contradictions and ambiguities that they provided 
inadequate guidance, making it necessary to make up their minds on general con-
siderations of justice.22  This assumption is contradicted by the evidence of the 
extant court speeches: in the roughly one hundred orations written for delivery in 
court, this default clause in the oath is mentioned only twice. This stands in 
marked contrast to the pledge binding judges to vote in accordance with the laws 
and decrees of the Athenian people, which is quoted, paraphrased, or alluded to 
dozens of times.  
The passages where the clause is found deserve scrutiny. The first occurs in 
Demosthenes’ speech Against Leptines (20.118-9). Just before mentioning this 
clause, Demosthenes reminds the judges about the first clause: “You have come 
here having sworn to judge in accordance with the laws, not those of the Spartans 
or the Thebans, nor even those that your earliest ancestors followed, but those 
under which they received the exemptions that this man here is taking away 
through his law.” Up to this point, in fact, Demosthenes has built his case against 
Leptines’ law in part on its procedural violations of the existing statutes. In particu-
lar, he discusses the law that requires anyone wishing to propose a new law first to 
repeal any opposing statutes (Dem. 20.92). He charges Leptines with having vio-
lated this law by failing to repeal the law making all awards granted by the people 
irrevocable before enacting his own law abolishing the exemptions (Dem. 20.95-
7). He then continues:  
                                                 
22 E.g. Christ (1998) 195-6.  
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As for matters where there are no laws, you have sworn to follow your most 
honest judgment. Apply this kind of judgment to the entire law. Is it not then 
right to give honors to your benefactors? It is right. What next? Is it not right 
to allow people to keep what someone once has given them? It is right. Then 
do this in order to abide by your oath, and show your anger if anyone claims 
that your  ancestors acted differently. If anyone should cite examples of cases 
where those men did not grant an honor to someone after receiving an impor-
tant benefit, you should consider them dishonest and uncouth, dishonest be-
cause they tell lies about your ancestors and misrepresent them as ungrateful, 
uncouth because they  are unaware that even if that was the way things were, it 
is their duty to deny it rather than to repeat it. (Dem. 20.118-19).  
In this passage Demosthenes does not ask the judges to rely only on their most 
judge judgment. He uses this clause to introduce another argument based on gen-
eral considerations of justice in addition to (and not as a substitute for) arguments 
based on the written laws.  
The clause is used in a similar way in the other passage where a litigant appeals 
to it in Demosthenes’ speech Against Boeotus I (39.39-40). The accuser is a man 
named Mantitheus who has brought a suit against his half-brother Boeotus for us-
ing his name.23 He claims that if Boeotus continues to use the name Mantitheus, it 
will cause him enormous hardship. In the final part of his speech, Mantitheus 
challenges Boeotus to find a law that gives children power over their names. To 
anticipate his reply, he reminds the court that the law gives parents the power to 
give their children names and also to erase these names and disinherit them if 
they wish. Here he says that the judges “have sworn to vote with their most just 
judgment so that if there is no law laid down about the topic, even in this case, 
they would rightly case their vote for him.” He next asks the judges if any of them 
have given his child two names or if those without children will do so. “No, of 
course,” he replies for them. If in their opinion this is right for their children, then 
it is right (hosion) for them to decide this way in his case. In the final words of the 
speech, Mantitheus concludes that the judge should vote for him both on the 
grounds that such a decision is in accordance with their most just judgment, the 
laws, and their oath. Thus Mantitheus does not invoke this part of the oath be-
cause he has no laws to support his case and must resort to the judges’ most just 
judgment alone. Nor does he use this clause to undermine the validity of the exist-
ing laws. Like Demosthenes in Against Leptines, Mantitheus uses this part of the 
oath to introduce a supplementary argument in addition to his arguments based 
on the written laws. One should not therefore use this clause of the judicial oath 
as an argument that the laws of Athens were full of gaps and that as a result judges 
relied on their own judgment.24  
                                                 
23 For an analysis of the legal issue in the speech see Harris (2000) 54-59. 
24 As, for example, does Harrison (1971) 48: “The general tenor of the oath suggests that 
the juror (sic) is to vote according to his conscience; there would certainly have been many 
cases not completely or not at all covered by law or decree.” Harrison does not examine 
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Nor should one claim that the laws and justice represented two different stan-
dards with the latter superior to the former and that the clause about using one’s 
must just judgment gave judges the right to follow their judgment if they believed 
that justice was in conflict with the laws.25 As noted above, this would place the two 
clauses of the oath in opposition to each other. Second as we have seen this clause 
is never used this way. Third, there is no reason to think that litigants and judges 
regarded the laws and justice represented two different standards. In fact, litigants 
used the terms law and justice as virtual synonyms and never view the two as in 
conflict. The following passages illustrate the point:  
Aeschines 3.199-200: “For justice is not left undefined, but has been defined 
in your laws. As in carpentry when we would like to know what is straight and 
what is not, we set the ruler, which we use as a standard, next to it, so in public ac-
tions against illegal proposals there is available as a ruler of justice this tablet with 
the decree proposed and the laws written next to it.”  
Antiphon 5.7: “For you it is just and in accordance with your oath, for you 
swore to judge the case according to the laws (nomous).  
Antiphon 5.87: “If you convict me, I am compelled by necessity to submit to 
justice and the law even if I am not the murderer and no responsibility for the 
crime.”  
Isaeus 2.47: “Remember the law and the oath that you have sworn and what 
has been said about the case and cast a vote that is just, true to your oath, and in 
conformity the laws.”  
Isaeus 4.31: “Remember the laws and the oaths that you swore, and also the 
testimony that we have provided and cast a just vote.” 
Isaeus 6.65: “If you order him to prove the allegation made in his claim, you 
will cast a righteous vote in accordance with the laws, and justice will be done for 
these men.” 
Isaeus 8.46: “Remember, therefore, the oaths that you swore when serving as 
judges and the arguments that we have made and the laws and casts a vote as jus-
tice requires.”  
Isaeus 9.35: “Therefore lend me your support, and if Cleon is more talented 
at speaking than I am, do not let this talent, which is without law and justice, pre-
vail, but make yourselves arbitrators of the entire case.”  
                                                                                                                                                        
the passages where the default clause is cited and provides no evidence at all to support his 
sweeping statement. For a similar view see Ruschenbusch (1957), who claims that there 
were gaps in Athenian law, but most of the evidence discussed pertains to the alleged lack 
of clarity of Athenian statutes, a very different issue.  
25 For the view that law and justice represented two different standards see Christ (1998) 
195: “While law was in a certain uncontroversial sense a standard (kanôn: Lyc. 1.18-9; cf. 
Aeschin. 3.199-200) of the courts, jurors (sic) determined how and whether to enforce the 
laws on the basis of a more fundamental standard - namely their sense of “what is just: (ta 
dikaia).” The passages cited below decisively refute Christ’s assumption that the Atheni-
ans believed that their laws and justice were two different standards. 
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Isaeus 11.18: “…those who were judging the case considered justice and their 
oaths very important with the result that they voted for me because my case was in 
accordance with the laws.” 
Isaeus 11.35: “This is what is most just; this is also what the laws command…” 
Lysias 9.19: “Their action was completely in accordance with the laws and 
fairness (eikos), and they clearly committed no injustice, but paid most attention 
to what is just.”  
Lysias 14.22: “So that if justice is not on their side, and they demand that you 
do them a favor, you must bear in mind that they are telling you to violate your 
oath and disobey the laws,…” 
Lysias 14. 42: “Have they not acted contrary to justice and law both toward 
other people in public and in their personal relations?”  
Lysias 14.46: “Read the laws, the oaths, and the charge to the judges. Let them 
keep these in mind and give a just verdict.” 
Demosthenes 43.34: “Whoever of these two you think speaks more justly and 
more in conformity with the laws, it is clear that you will take his side.” 
Demosthenes 43.52: “This is what the law states, and this is what is just.” 
Demosthenes 43.60: “But if Theopompus has died, the laws have not died, 
nor has justice died, nor have the judges who decide the case.”  
Demosthenes 43.84: “Defend the laws and take care of the dead so that their 
house does not become abandoned. By doing this you will cast a just vote, one 
that is in conformity with the laws and in your interests.”  
Demosthenes 46.28: “I implore and beg all of you, men of the court, to de-
fend me and to punish those who so readily give false testimony for your own 
sake, for mine, for justice, and for the laws.” 
Note that in many of these passages, the litigant explicitly states that a just vote 
is one cast according to the laws. One should also bear in mind that several of 
these passages are the last words in a speech. They thus are found in a very 
prominent place, which amply demonstrates how much stress litigants placed on 
the equivalence of law and justice. What these litigants wanted the judges to bear 
in mind as they decided how to vote was that they had sworn an oath and that 
oath required them to vote in accordance with the laws, not just in a way that 
seemed right to them.  
The message of the judicial oath is clear: it bound the judges to vote in accor-
dance with the laws. It is therefore not surprising that when orators mention or al-
lude to the oath, they also mention the laws.26 On the other hand, the importance 
of the clause “I will vote with my most fair judgment in cases where there are no 
laws” should not be exaggerated or taken out of context. Above all, it did not grant 
the judges the right to ignore the law if they considered it wrong. What is most 
striking (and most ignored by some scholars) is how rare this clause is invoked 
and how it is used in the only two passages where it is found. And in no extant 
                                                 
26 E.g. Dem. 19.134, 239, 297; 21.177, 211; 22.45; 23.101; 39.41; 27.63; Isaeus 2.47; 8.46. 
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speech delivered in an Athenian court does a litigant rely solely on this clause and 
ignore the pledge to vote in accordance with the laws.  
 
 
2. Despite the evidence of the judicial oath, it has become fashionable in some 
circles to claim that trials in Athens were political events.27 According to this view, 
the courts did not primarily serve as “guardians of the laws” (Dem. 24.36), but 
were arenas for political and social contests. Litigants aimed to use the courts as 
weapons in political struggles, and decisions were made on the basis of political or 
social considerations.28 There is no reason to doubt that many trials in Athens 
were “political” to some extent, but one must be careful to define what one means 
by the term “political.” This is especially true nowadays when the terms “political” 
and “politics” have been stretched so far that they seem to mean almost anything. 
In recent scholarship “politics” is often used of any activity where there is a strug-
gle for power and influence. But when examining Athenian attitudes, one must be 
careful to analyze their behavior in terms of their own practices and ideas.  
The Athenians drew a general distinction between ta koina or ta politika, mat-
ters pertaining to the community, and ta idia, matters pertaining to private indi-
viduals. Decisions about the former were made in the Council and Assembly or 
left in the hands of officials appointed by the community. Decisions about private 
life concerned activities like marriage, friendship, and personal finances. A trial on 
a private charge (dikê) was not political in the Athenian sense of the term. It arose 
because of a private dispute between individuals, and its outcome did not have 
broad implications for the community. Even if the defendant in a private case 
were a famous politician, the outcome of such a trial would have little, if any, ef-
fect on his political career. For this reason a litigant in a dikê aikeias states that his 
public service is simply not relevant to the case (Dem. 54.44).  
A trial on a public charge (graphê) might by contrast be political in one sense: 
it might involve prominent politicians whose careers were affected by the outcome 
of the trial. For instance, Pericles was removed from office, convicted and fined in 
429 BCE (Th. 2.65). His trial had a temporary (but not long-lasting) effect on his 
political career. Alcibiades’ trial in absentia for impiety resulted in a sentence of 
permanent exile, which put an end to his political career in Athens - for the mo-
ment (Thuc. 6.61). Timotheus was convicted and received an enormous fine, 
which forced him out of politics (Dinarchus 1.14). Aeschines’ humiliating loss at 
the trial of Ctesiphon appears to have driven him from politics and possibly into 
exile.29 In this sense one could call some trials in Classical Athens “political.”  
                                                 
27 The most extreme proponents of this view are Ober (1989) and Cohen (1995). Although 
popular among some social historians, this view is not shared by many legal historians.  
28 For example, see Todd (1993) 29: “politics and law were at Athens ultimately indistin-
guishable.” This extreme statement is well criticized by Christ (1998) 42-3.  
29 On the verdict see Harris (1995) 148.  
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But there is no reason to think that the Athenians view trials as just another po-
litical procedure no different from policy-making in the Council and Assembly.30 
Nor are there grounds for believing that the courts normally decided cases on po-
litical grounds. In the accounts they give of judicial verdicts, litigants almost never 
say that the judges voted for an accuser because they favored his policy or against 
a defendant because they were opposed to his political agenda. For example, the 
trial of Euctemon involved several active politicians, but the outcome of the trial 
was not determined by political factors (Dem. 24.11-14). During an embassy to 
Mausolus, Androtion and two other ambassadors sailing on an Athenian vessel 
captured an enemy ship off Naucratis in Egypt. The Assembly decided that the 
ship was enemy property and thus belonged to the state. Euctemon proposed that 
the people recover the money from the trierarchs who captained the Athenian 
ship and that the trierarchs could then collect it from those who held it. If there 
was any dispute, there would be an adjudication among the claimants (diadikasia), 
and the person who lost would hand over the money to the city. Androtion, Glau-
cetes, and Melanopus brought a public action against the decree, which must have 
been a graphê paranomôn (action against an illegal decree). According to the 
speaker, it was judged that the decree was proposed in accordance with the laws, 
and the defendant was acquitted.31 The reason given for the court’s decision is that 
the accuser did not prove the legal charge against the defendant. Nothing is said 
about the political aspect of the case. 
When litigants mention the public services of defendants, they say that they 
had no effect on the decision of the judges. Take, for example, the account given 
by Aeschines (3.195) of the trial of Thrasybulus of Steiria soon after the restora-
tion of the democracy in 403 BCE: “Archinus of Coele brought a public charge 
for an illegal decree against Thrasybulus of Steiria, one of the men who returned 
with him from Phyle although his public services were very recent. The judges did 
not take them into account. They considered that just as Thrasybulus had re-
stored them from exile, he was attempting to send them into exile again by pro-
posing an illegal motion.”32 
One finds a similar analysis of Timotheus’ conviction for bribery in Dinarchus’ 
Against Demosthenes (14): “Men of Athens, you did not take Timotheus’ 
achievements into account. He sailed around the Peloponnese and defeated the 
                                                 
30 For the division between the deliberative and judicial parts of the Athenian polis see Th. 
2.37 with Harris (2006a) 29-39. 
31 Compare the analysis given by Demosthenes (18.249-50) for his acquittal in a graphê 
paranomôn: the court found that his proposal was made in accordance with the laws. Al-
though the trial involved active politicians, Demosthenes does not say that politics af-
fected the verdict.  
32 Aeschines (3.196) goes on to claim that generals who have received maintenance at the 
Prytaneum now ask to be acquitted presumably on the basis of their public service, but 
Aeschines does not say they are successful and gives no names of specific examples. The 
passage is a typical lament about the decline of contemporary morals and is no more than 
empty rhetoric.  
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Spartans in a naval battle near Corcyra. He was the son of Conon, who liberated 
the Greeks and captured Samos, Methone, Pydna, Potidaea and twenty other cit-
ies as well. You did not allow public services like these to influence the trial or the 
oath that you obeyed while casting your votes, but you fined him one hundred tal-
ents because Aristophon said he received money from the Chians and Rhodians.” 
Both orators may be simplifying a complex reality, but they must be presenting an 
analysis of the court’s reasons for its decision that would have appeared plausible 
to the judges and the audience attending the trial. In each case, the defendant had 
an impressive record of public service, yet both Demosthenes and Dinarchus say 
that the generals were convicted because they were guilty as charged. They also as-
sert that the judges obeyed their oath and were not swayed by political considera-
tions.  
Promises by accusers to pay large political rewards also did not make the 
judges betray their oath. Hyperides (4.35-6) reports that Lysander charged 
Epicrates of Pallene with digging his mine inside the limits of another man’s mine 
and promised to bring in three hundred talents for the city’s budget.33 “The judges 
paid no attention to the accuser’s promises but followed what justice required: 
they determined that the mine was inside its own boundaries and by that same 
vote made their property secure and confirmed the rest of their period for work-
ing the mine.” The accuser’s promise did not sway the judges; they paid attention 
to the law and the facts of the case. When they saw that the defendant’s actions 
did not violate the law and that he was not guilty of the charge of encroaching on 
another’s mine, he was acquitted. Political factors did not play a role despite the 
accuser’s best efforts.  
When the orators mention the social status of a defendant, they normally indi-
cate that the courts were not influenced by it. For instance, Demosthenes recalls 
the trial and execution of a man named Pyrrhus, who was a member of Eteobuta-
dae, a famous genos, from whom the priestess of Athena Polias was selected 
(Aeschines 2.147).34 Despite his high social status, Pyrrhus “was denounced for 
serving as judge when he owed money to the treasury, some of you thought that 
he must be put to death, and after being convicted in your court, he was executed. 
And yet he tried to receive his payment because of poverty, not to commit abuse.” 
The judges might have taken either of two factors, his social status or his poverty, 
into account, but they looked only at his actions.35 
If the courts allowed factors like public service or social status to influence 
their decisions, they would not only have violated their oaths but also Athenian 
                                                 
33 For the nature of the charge see Whitehead (2000) 248-9 with references to earlier litera-
ture.  
34 On this genos see Parker (1996) 290-93. 
35 See also Dem. 54. where the Areopagus convicted a man and sentenced him to exile for 
deliberate homicide despite the fact that he was the father of the priestess of Brauron. For 
the nature of the charge see Harris (2006a) 397-8. 
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belief in equality before the law (isonomia). Theseus in Euripides’ Suppliant 
Women (429-37) succinctly expresses the ideal:  
There is nothing more inimical to a city than a tyrant. In this case, first of all 
  
the laws are not common property, but one man owns the law for himself. 
There  
is not longer any equality (ison). But when the laws are written, the weak and 
the  
rich have equal justice, the weaker have the same right to speak as the fortu-
nate 
when the former is slandered, and the lesser man prevails over the mighty 
when  
he has justice on his side.  
Although the public service or social status of a defendant was not considered 
relevant when assessing guilt or innocence, in the second part of a public case, 
there was a different standard of relevance. In his speech Against Meidias 
Demosthenes (21.151) makes it clear that it was permissible to mention liturgies 
during the second phase of the trial when the penalty was assessed (timêsis). 
Demosthenes imagines a friend advising him not to pursue his case against 
Meidias because of his wealth. He admits that the court will probably convict 
Meidias because he is clearly guilty of hybris, But at the second part of the trial 
Meidias will boast about his public service and convince the court to give him a 
light penalty. “He has been convicted, and the vote was against him. What penalty 
do you expect the court to assess for him? Don’t you see that he is rich and will 
mention his trierarchies and liturgies? Watch out lest he asks for lenient treatment 
with these tactics and has a good laugh at your expense when he pays a fine that is 
smaller than the amount he is offering to give you.” The imaginary friend does not 
say that such conduct is illegal or immoral. Nor does Demosthenes object to such 
a tactic. Instead he argues that Meidias’ public services are not that impressive and 
therefore should not count in his favor (Dem. 21.152-68). In other words 
Demosthenes appears to consider it acceptable for a defendant to ask the court to 
take liturgies and military service into account during the second part of the trial.36 
In his speech Against Ctesiphon Aeschines (3.197-200) also indicates that 
there was a different standard of relevance in each part of a trial on a public 
charge. In a public trial the day is divided into three parts: the first is for the ac-
cuser, the laws, and the democracy; the second for the defendant and those who 
speak to the point (eis auto to prâgma), that is, supporting speakers who address 
                                                 
36 Demosthenes probably deals with the question in his speech delivered at the first part of 
the trial to anticipate Meidias’ arguments in the second part of the trial. Because Meidias’ 
record of service appears to have been impressive, Demosthenes probably thought that 
the relatively short amount of time allotted to him for discussion of the penalty at the 
timesis phase would not be enough for an adequate response. He therefore decided to de-
vote part of his first speech to the topic. 
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the charge in the indictment; and the third for the assessment of the penalty and 
to measure the extent of the judges’ anger. “To measure the extent of the judges’ 
anger” means that if the offense is greater and stirs more anger, the penalty will be 
more severe; if the offense is less serious and stirs less anger, the penalty will be 
less severe. At this point Aeschines introduces a contrast between those who 
speak to the point and a person “who asks for a vote.” The implicit contrast sug-
gests that the person who “asks for a vote” is one who does not speak to the point 
and address the legal issue but asks for a vote in gratitude for their public service 
or a sign of respect for their power and influence. Aeschines does not criticize a 
speaker for making such an appeal at this stage in the trial. But the person who 
“asks for a vote” for these reasons during the first phase of the trial is in effect ask-
ing the judges to betray their oaths, the laws, and the democracy. Aeschines says 
that it is immoral to make such a request or to grant it when the judges are con-
sidering the guilt of the defendant. He then goes one step further and argues that 
there is no need for supporting speakers at all during the first part of the trial be-
cause here the decision is guided solely the laws. This proposal is clearly aimed at 
Demosthenes, who, he claims, is the type of supporting speaker who employs 
sophistry. As a result, the judges should not listen to him if he addresses the court 
during the first part of the trial.  
Some of Aeschines’ argument in this passage is tendentious, designed at un-
dermining his opponent’s credibility before he has a chance to reply to the 
charges against Ctesiphon. In actuality, Demosthenes does address the main 
points in the indictment against Ctesiphon; though there is room for debate about 
his defense of his political career, his interpretation of the laws about crowns is 
based on a more straightforward reading of the statutes and supported by numer-
ous precedents. What is significant is that Aeschines makes a clear distinction be-
tween the types of arguments that are appropriate at each part of the trial. In the 
first part of the trial a supporting speaker should keep to the point; during the as-
sessment of the penalty a speaker can “ask for a vote” and use arguments that 
would be inappropriate during the first part of the trial.  
These different standards of relevance at a public trial explain the behavior of 
Eubulus at the trials of Hegesilaos and Thrasybulus. During his prosecution of 
Aeschines in 343 for misconduct as ambassador to Philip, Demosthenes (19.290) 
was concerned that Eubulus would use his prestige to influence the judges and 
tried to discourage him from speaking for his opponent. He therefore reminds 
Eubulus how when Hegesilaos and Thrasybulus called on him during the first 
phase of their trials (prôtês psêphou), he did not respond.37 Then during the as-
sessment of the penalty (timêma) he did step forward (anabas), which was obvi-
ously a show of support and was in contrast to his earlier refusal. Demosthenes 
adds that Eubulus still did not say anything at this point and asked the judges to 
                                                 
37 MacDowell (2000) 331 rightly argues that Demosthenes refers to two trials, not one trial 
of two men.  
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forgive him.38 Eubulus acted differently at each stage of the trial because he did not 
think his intervention was appropriate at the first stage of the trial. He was not in 
court to plead the case for the defendants, but to lend moral support for a relative 
and a friend. He therefore did not consider it right to come forward during the 
first part of the trial when the judges were deciding whether the defendant had 
broken the law or not. During the second phase by contrast it was expected of 
him to say something in support of his relative and friend and to try to influence 
the court. When he was unable to say anything (Demosthenes does not give the 
reason), he failed to perform his duty as relative and friend and therefore asked to 
be forgiven. After all, one only asks for pardon when one cannot do what is ex-
pected or required.  
The only example of a speech that purports to have been delivered at the 
timêsis phase is found in the second part of Plato’s Apology of Socrates (35c-38c). 
It is impossible to determine how closely the text of this speech reproduces what 
Socrates said in court at his trial in 399, but it should contain the kind of argu-
ments one would expect to find in a forensic speech. Indeed the first part of the 
Apology adheres to many of the conventions of forensic oratory even when Socra-
tes subverts or critiques them. For instance, Socrates prefaces his speech with a 
standard captatio benevolentiae, attempting to gain the court’s sympathy by por-
traying himself at a disadvantage. Toward the end of his first speech he alludes to 
the well-known practice of bringing one’s family into court even if he declines to 
follow it. In general, Socrates attempts to “stick to the point” by addressing the 
main charges in the indictment (19a-b). The earlier charges against him, which 
might prejudice the court’s opinion, are dealt with at 19-24b. Meletus’ charges are 
refuted at 24b-34b. At the end of this section produces witnesses to refute one of 
the main charges and to prove that he does not corrupt the youth (32c-34b). He 
mentions his military service only as part of an analogy: he obeyed the order of 
the Delphic oracle just as he obeyed the orders of his commanders in battle (28e-
29a).  
In his second speech, however, Socrates discusses the benefits he has con-
ferred on each Athenian individually in his private life. In his first speech he de-
nied that he corrupted the youth. Here he switches from the negative to the posi-
tive: he talks not about his guilt or innocence but about his worth (axian) and his 
claim to be considered a benefactor. Had he been a normal citizen, he would 
have spoken about his public service, his military offices, and his liturgies at this 
point. Thus topics that Socrates did not consider relevant in his first speech come 
to the fore when the court was deciding which penalty to choose.  
An anecdote from Aeschines’ speech Against Timarchus confirms this analy-
sis. Aeschines (1.113) recalls Timarchus’ conviction for theft of public funds. Ti-
marchus had been elected inspector of mercenary troops in Eretria and on his re-
turn to Athens was put on trial for embezzling money entrusted to him along with 
                                                 
38 Neither MacDowell (2000) 332 nor Paulsen (1999) 272-3 analyzes the reasons for Eubu-
lus’ behavior.  
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two other inspectors. At the first part of his trial, Timarchus did not make his de-
fense about the charge, but admitted his guilt and immediately supplicated the 
court about the penalty. His speech was therefore not relevant at this part of the 
trial (ou peri tou pragmatos).39 As a result, it was not taken into consideration by 
the court, and Timarchus was convicted just like the other two inspectors who did 
not confess. The fact that he confessed his crime set him apart from his col-
leagues, but since his confession had nothing to do with the question of guilt or 
innocence, it made no difference, and all three received the same verdict. His 
confession did however make a difference at the assessment stage: those who de-
nied their guilt were fined a talent apiece, whereas Timarchus was fined thirty 
mnai, half that amount. The incident reveals how the two different standards 
worked in practice. Timarchus and other litigants might attempt to sway the court 
with irrelevant arguments during the first part of the trial, but if the judges obeyed 
their oath, they would ignore extraneous considerations and examine just the rele-
vant issues.40 Like the other cases examined in the beginning of this section, 
Aeschines’ explanation shows that even in cases involving politicians, the court did 
not make its decision about innocence and guilt on political grounds.  
Modern scholars (except those who believe in necromancy) cannot raise 
Athenian judges from the dead and ask them why they voted the way they did in a 
particular case. But the orators frequently tell us what they thought were the rea-
sons for their decisions. Of course, we have no means of testing their assertions. 
But it is reasonable to assume that the judges and onlookers must have found 
these explanations plausible. Indeed, they would not put forward these explana-
tions unless they thought they would positively influence the judges’ decision. 
There is no reason to deny that some trials in Athens were political, but the Athe-
nians did not believe that these trials were decided on political grounds. Because 
they believed in the rule of law, they assumed that their fellow citizens did too.  
                                                 
39 The phrase ou peri tou pragmatos clearly alludes to the litigant’s promise to speak to the 
point and the judges’ duty to pay attention only to matters relevant to the charge 
brought by the accuser. See Rhodes (2004). Carey (2000) 62 translates the sentence “He 
did not address his defense to the question of fact” but this misses the allusion to the re-
quirement to speak “to the point.” The translation of Fisher (2001) 97 is closer to the re-
quired sense: “he made no defense on the charge.”  
40 Fisher (2001) 253 refers to Timarchus’ strategy as “plea-bargaining,” but this misunder-
stands the nature of the Athenian legal system. Plea-bargaining is only possible in a sys-
tem where a permanent public prosecutor has the power to bargain with defendants on 
behalf of the state and offer them a reduced sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty, 
which avoids a trial. Because the Athenian legal system had no permanent public prosecu-
tor with such power, plea-bargaining was not possible. Fisher also claims “There is likely 
to be no little evasion and distortion in this account” but does not specify what the distor-
tion might be. Yet because the trial involved a public figure, it must have been common 
knowledge. And the explanation of the different standards of relevance must have ap-
peared plausible to the judges Aeschines was addressing as the evidence analyzed in the 
rest of this section reveals.  
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